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Abstract 
Currently, many health scholars are concerned about health scares. But what do they mean by 
the term ‘health scare’ – are health scares an identifiable phenomenon, and how do we 
currently understand their causation and consequences? By collecting and analyzing published 
articles about events considered to be health scares, this paper maps the current views of 
scholars on their characteristics and causes. Results show that health scares are generally 
understood as events characterized by fears of catastrophic consequences but little actual 
mortality. However, the social and economic impacts of these events have often been severe. 
This survey shows that health scares can be usefully sorted into 6 categories, each with 
identifiable internal dynamics, suggesting different communications strategies to achieve 
resolution in each category. Using the social amplification of risk framework, the conditions 
under which risk signals were amplified were traced in general terms among major 
stakeholders. Simple causes for health scare events could not be identified, though some 
triggers did emerge. Importantly, public ignorance of real risk, media scaremongering, and 
political inaction could be dismissed as primary explanations, though they were sometimes 
factors in scare events. Implications for risk communication and for future research on risk and 
public health are discussed. 
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 In the age of SARS and ‘mad cow’ (BSE – bovine spongiform encephalitis) disease, many 
health professionals in both government and academe worry about what they refer to as ‘health 
scares’. Exactly what these are is, however, unclear. Are they small risks falsely judged as large, 
as were fluoride additives to water - or alternatively a form of ‘health panic’ (Moynihan, Heath, 
and Henry, 2002; Rail and Beausoleil, 2003) or moral panic (Ungar, 2001, McRobbie and 
Thornton, 1995)? The colloquialism seems often to be an umbrella term for a raft of different 
concerns: sometimes of governments meeting public demands to spend vast sums on 
protections against negligible risks, and yet at other times of government failure to commit 
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sufficient resources to protect against others risks; of panicky public reactions to media beat-
ups, and yet also of public ignorance of highly damaging risks; of the failure to identify and 
control the pandemic of influenza feared to be coming, and simultaneously that planning for it 
will end up costing more than we wish it to in terms of lost revenue, or public mistrust or 
complacency, or the shunning of particular cultural groups. In particular there are concerns 
about the enormous political and economic costs of certain scare situations, so disproportionate 
do they seem when compared to the actual mortality attributable to, for example, SARS or 
anthrax or  ‘new variant’ Creuzfeld-Jakob disease (nvCJD) (Skinner, 2004). 
 
The first aim of this paper is to use the extant literature to work out what scholars mean 
by the term ‘health scare’. Because there are inconsistencies and contradictions in the hopes 
and views expressed by health professionals and policymakers in informal conversation, it 
seems useful to map out clearly what sorts of events are generally intended by the term and 
what sets of concerns are raised with respect to them. By so doing we may be able to compare 
across events and usefully find ways of categorizing them or of identifying any features or 
properties common to them. This may ultimately suggest ways of more effectively resolving 
them or of minimizing their negative impacts.  
 
However, there is a lack of connection between how fear is treated in different parts of 
public health: concerns over health scares in some quarters yet repeated warnings of 
catastrophic health events from others, not to mention the steady stream of fear appeals issued 
annually by health promoters in any western nation. This lack of coherence raises questions 
concerning the assumptions public health scholars make about the causes and consequences of 
health scares. At this point, therefore, a second aim emerges: to treat ‘health scares’ as a 
constructed category, in line with recent sociological approaches to understanding risk (Beck, 
1999, Lupton, 1999, Douglas, 1992), and to outline present scholarly and professional thinking 
about them, for general inspection and discussion. What assumptions are we making about why 
events occur or why they generate high economic and social costs? To whom do we currently 
attribute responsibility for causing or managing health scares? What exactly is it that we want to 
change?  
 
 The variety and inconsistencies of the concerns denoted by the colloquial use of the 
term ‘health scares’ are indicative of public health encountering the arena of risk – of decision 
making under conditions of uncertainty, of the possibilities and pitfalls of communicating about 
risks to various stakeholder audiences. Risk has attracted an extensive scholarship amongst 
those in research and public policy concerned chiefly with environmental and industrial risks 
(Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic, 2003; Slovic, 2000), which has demonstrated, among other 
things, how differently risk is defined and understood by different disciplines and stakeholders. 
For example, the most common definitions of risk in professional public health are derived from 
the technical instrumentalities of epidemiology (Lupton, 1999), but these cannot define an 
individual’s risk, which may well be defined by that individual by values (Slovic, 2000), narrative 
or the perceived consequences for them (Hoffmaster, 1991). Concepts of risk among different 
stakeholders may thus become incommensurable.  
 
 Similarly, ‘health scares’ may also be an expression of contemporary social anxieties, as 
predicted by recent sociological approaches to risk. ‘Risk society’ theorists such as (most 
famously) Ulrich Beck (1992) and Antony Giddens (1999) suggest that insecurity and uncertainty 
are hallmark characteristics of late modern society, as people become increasingly concerned 
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about the potentially catastrophic consequences of the conditions of late modernity itself. 
Reflexivity and ontological insecurity have shifted social anxieties from moral panics towards an 
increasing preoccupation with emergencies and disasters (Ungar, 2001). This study speaks to 
ongoing debates about the extent, qualities and impacts of ‘risk society’ (Adamson et al, 2000; 
Mythen and Walklate, 2006). An alternative perspective, the Foucauldian or ‘governmentality’ 
approach to risk, sees concepts of risk as central to government instrumentalities, especially in 
the field of public health (Burchell, 1991; Lupton and Petersen, 1996; Petersen and Wilkinson, 
2008). These authors articulate how the knowledges, practices and technologies of risk become 
central ways of producing and managing social identities and social problems (Petersen and 
Wilkinson, 2008; Petersen, 1997). ‘Health scares’ may represent disruptions or new 
configurations of these governmental modalities. 
 
`This scholarship has hitherto experienced a remarkably low take-up in public health 
(Alaszewski and Horlick-Jones, 2003), although there are signs this is changing, for example in 
the use of risk communication principles in health communication (Covello, Peters, Wojteki, and 
Hyde, 2001). Many health professionals’ concerns about ‘health scares’ – for example, 
frustration with dramatic public responses to relatively ‘tiny’ risks (eg, the intentional 
distribution of anthrax) versus their tolerance for comparatively large risks (eg, smoking) (‘tiny’ 
and ‘large’ here being defined by occurrence in a population) – are, of course, perfectly 
explicable in terms of our knowledge of how risk is cognitively processed (Slovic, 2000) or 
experienced (Lupton, 1999). 
 
Rather than a definition of risk, in this study I use the concepts of risk amplification and 
attenuation as developed in the social amplification of risk framework (SAR framework) (Horlick-
Jones, Sime, and Pidgeon, 2003; Pidgeon et al., 2003). In the framework, risk events / hazards 
can only be given meaning by being communicated. Communication occurs by means of signals 
(words, signs, symbols, images) that may be amplified (the risk seems larger or scarier) or 
attenuated (the risk seems lessened). The framework shows that amplification or attenuation of 
risk signals will occur as they are processed and responded to by different social actors (termed 
‘social stations’ in the original theory) – individuals, stakeholder organizations, the mass media, 
and so forth. For example, the risk signals of aircraft travel may be amplified by news media 
coverage of a recent jet crash. We can use existing sociological theories and tools to identify 
how and why risk signal amplification occurs in any given social station. This framework thus 
allows us to track how a risk is defined and perceived at any given point during a health scare 
event. 
 
This conceptual approach obviates the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘false’ risks since 
no matter what their objective value, in our understanding of them, risks are always only as 
great as their signal value at any given time, and this signal value will be significantly affected by 
physical consequences such as high mortality (which will naturally have an amplifying effect!). 
Risks are therefore always, necessarily, socially constructed, since at the very least their ‘real’ 
magnitude is influenced by social perceptions of and responses to them. In fact this framework 
indicates that in most cases the ‘realness’ of a risk is measured by the outcome of a risk event: if 
the outcomes are bad, the risk is judged as ‘real’ in retrospect. Understanding this is important if 
we are to analyse risk events that have real, physical causes and consequences but whose 
structure and progress are typically influenced by public perception and social responses. The 
SAR framework has already been profitably applied to particular health scares such as bovine 
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spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or ‘mad cow disease) (Barnett and Breakwell, 2003; Pidgeon et 
al., 2003).  
 
This paper is not an evaluation or extension of SARF, but in it I ask what social groups, or 
stakeholders, are identified in studies of health scares as the source of risk signal amplification, 
and why. We might expect that the primary explanation most health professionals would offer 
for the cause of health scares would be in terms of public ignorance or lack of knowledge, the 
absence of appropriate government regulation, or, especially, of media sensationalizing (Gwyn, 
2002). But are causes really perceived so simply? It is time to take stock of exactly how public 
health scholars have perceived the issues of causes and consequences in their reflections on 
health scare situations. Identifying which groups have are considered by current scholarship to 
have generated risk signal amplification, and at what point and for what reason, is the third aim 
of this paper. 
 
Methods 
 
 Because of the varieties and inconsistencies expressed conversationally about health 
scares (and which may in the future be worth their own investigation through interview or focus 
group research), this study sought to capture a snapshot of the spectrum of professional opinion 
by examining published works. Here publications are treated both as a primary resource – texts 
to be analysed – and a secondary resource – a source of concepts and analysis that may be 
applied to the subject itself (Bentley, 1999).  
 
This research used a two-phase strategy. First, in mid 2004 four electronic databases – 
Medline, PubHealth, and PAIS International, representing the fields of medicine and public 
health, and Sociofile (now ‘Sociological Abstracts’), representing sociology (where I 
hypothesized research articles on social reactions to health risk events might be published) - 
were searched using the words ‘health’ and ‘scare’ as key- and text-words, along with ‘fear’, 
‘anxiety’ and ‘panic’. The search was limited to matches that contained both ‘health’ and ‘scare’. 
These words were also all searched in combination with ‘media’ specifically, but their 
combination with ‘disorder’ was excluded because it produced too many irrelevant matches. To 
ensure that the search was as comprehensive as possible, searches were also conducted across 
all three databases on individual topics that were at that time known to have aroused public 
anxiety: SARS, Escherichia coli, hamburger, Tylenol, anthrax, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy, mad cow, mobile and cellular telephones, contraceptives, the Pill, dioxin and 
powerlines (there was no specific search focus on avian influenza, which was receiving 
comparatively little public attention at the time of the search, probably a result of the then 
strong media focus on SARS and West Nile virus in North America).  Out of the resulting list of 
199 articles only those works published in scholarly and professional journals, and only those 
that included discussion of particular events and/or social (broadly defined for this purpose as 
‘non technical’) aspects of the issue, were retained for review. The sample did not contain 
references to individual experience (eg, the fears an individual entertains for themselves in 
relation to a threatening diagnosis) or to cases of mass hysterical illness (eg (Mohr and Bond, 
1982). 
 
The resulting collection of 158 published retrospectives, investigations, polemics and 
hypotheticals concerning health scare events was by no means exhaustive (as the absence of 
avian influenza indicates!). Many of the issues that were raised by authors have large literatures 
 5 
devoted to them that found no representation in it (examples would include decision making 
theory (Chapman and Sonnenberg, 2000; Cohen and Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of 
Industrial Society., 2000) and ‘risk society’ theory (Beck, 1999; Beck and Ritter, 1992)). 
Discussion of scare events are often embedded in papers on other topics (such as terrorism 
preparedness or environmental issues). Brief internet searches on a selection of the topics 
raised in the resulting 158 publications – examples are meningitis, cryptosporidium, and food 
poisoning – showed that more such events had occurred and been discussed by health 
professionals in professional forums as well as in peer reviewed journals.  Similarly this approach 
could not hope to comprehensively represent the complexity and range of opinion among 
health scholars and professionals on all these topics. However, reaching saturation for many 
major themes and problematisations in the sample, added to cross checking using internet 
searches, indicated that the search methods had captured an extensive and representative 
literature about health scares. 
 
In phase two, the sample of 158 publications were classified by topic and (main) 
disciplinary background. Analysis was emergent and iterative, in the interpretivist tradition 
(Creswell, 2007). A coding scheme was developed to identify firstly, types and qualities of 
events, and secondly, (through keywords and then questions and statements), how 
problematisation was constructed by the author, and how solutions were formulated, and 
related to disciplinary outlook. Articles were coded for factors that amplified or attenuated risk, 
drawn from the categories within the ‘social stations’ described b the SAR framework. The main 
focus of analysis then became the role played by different stakeholders (an equivalent for ‘social 
stations’, meaning social groups or arenas, in the original SAR framework) as represented in 
each publication. These were tabulated to demonstrate both how different stakeholders were 
represented within this sample and to map out how and when risk signal amplification occurred, 
as identified by commentators and those involved. 
 
Results  
 
The sample  
  
158 publications were collected, including 9 books. As shown in Table I, only 3 explicitly 
addressed the concept ‘health scare’ directly (Gwyn, 1999, 2002; Whelan, 1985). However, 14 
discussed or compared more than one case (Covello et al., 2001; Ferreira, 2004; Gwyn, 1999, 
2002; Klapp, 1992; Maxwell, 2003; Powell and Leiss, 1997; Rosner and Markowitz, 2002; Shickle, 
2000; Stoto, 2002; Whelan, 1985; Leiss, 2001; Leiss and Chociolko, 1994), implying these cases 
were representative of a wider phenomenon, ‘health scares’. In all, the publications offered 180 
individual discussions of 49 health scares topics. 
 
Table I : Focus of publications collected  
 
 Number 
discussing ‘health 
scares’ 
Number 
discussing a single 
case 
Number 
discussing more 
than one case 
Number not 
focused on case 
study 
3 104 14 35 
Percentage of 
total 
2% 67% 9% 22% 
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Some events had attracted considerable attention, suggesting that what constitutes a 
‘health scare’ emerges from common understandings and concerns that cluster around specific 
events. By numbers of publications, the top three in this sample were an advisory about ‘third 
generation’ oral contraceptives in the UK in 1995 (see eg Balasch, 1997; Spitzer, 1997, 1999), 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) / prion diseases  and HIV/AIDS. To a significant degree 
this result must be regarded as an artifact of the search strategy, dependent on the genre and 
structure of the academic discussion on these subjects; other topics (eg, MMR vaccine and 
autism) have almost certainly engendered at least as many publications. But some of these 
concentrations, such as those relating to BSE and HIV/AIDS, and to a lesser degree anthrax and 
SARS, reflect shared perceptions of these high profile diseases.  
 
Table II: Most common health scare topics by number of publications*  
 
Health scare topic Number of publications 
Oral contraceptives 33 
BSE/prion diseases 16 articles, 3 book chapters, 2 books 
HIV/AIDS 13 articles, 1 book 
Anthrax 8 articles, 1 special issue, 1 report 
SARS 3 articles, 4 reports, 1 special issue 
HRT 7 articles 
Hazardous wastes 4 articles, 3 book chapters 
Vaccines 6 articles 
Dioxin 4 articles, 2 book chapter  
Powerlines/ mobile phones 4 articles, 2 book chapters 
GM foods 2 articles, 3 chapter 
E coli 1 article, 2 book chapters, 1 book 
Tylenol tampering 4 articles 
Radiation /nuclear disaster 2 articles, 2 book chapters 
Breast implants 1 article, 1 book chapter, 1 book 
PCBs 1 article, 2 book chapters 
Fluoride in water, radon gas, West Nile virus, 
bioterror excluding anthrax, alar, air 
contamination,  
2 articles 
X rays, flesh eating disease, faulty condoms, 
toxoplasmosis, blood products contamination, 
cholera, breast cancer, oil spills, channel blockers, 
cancer mortality, tampons, cryptosporidium in 
water, radium, tuberculosis, irradiated food, 
acrylamide, chloresterol (in eggs), Ebola, 
phthalates, lead, silica, swine influenza, meningitis, 
interferon, poisoning, rBST, mystery illness 
1 article or chapter 
Total 180 discussions, 49 topics 
 
* of these 180 discussions (as opposed to the 158 publications) only 7 (4%) discussed more than one topic 
 
The majority of publications in the sample as a whole (115 or 73%), were written by 
health professionals or came from health and science journals and can be taken to represent 
this group. Of the remaining 42 studies, 10 explicitly brought (at least) two disciplinary 
perspectives together. Social scientists, particularly those from a constructionist perspective, 
were interested in media and regulatory policy issues, and were particularly attracted to the 
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high profile subjects of BSE, GM foods and HIV/AIDS, (eg Brookes, 1999; Cummins, 2002; de 
Vries, van den Berg, and de Jong-van den Berg, 1998; European Parliament, 1998; Goodman and 
Du Puis, 2002; Jones, 1992; Lupton, 1994; Powell and Leiss, 1997; Tacke, 2001; Whiteside, 
2003).  
 
Table III: Articles by discipline / perspective  
 
 Number Percentage of total no. 
publications 
Health studies 115 73% 
Policy studies 16 10% 
Media studies  12 8% 
Risk studies 11 7% 
Market/consumer studies 5 3% 
Social/cultural studies 5 3% 
More than one perspective 10 6% 
 
Defining and classifying ‘health scares’ 
 
Use of term 72 articles (44%) used the term ‘scare’ to describe a public-level health risk 
event, implying a common understanding of ‘health scare’ as a social phenomenon quite 
differentiated from any private, individual experience of a severe threat to health (but see 
(Calnan, Dale, and de Fonseka, 1976). The use of the word in this proportion of publications 
suggests that colloquially ‘health scares’ recognizably denotes a family of health risk events.  
 
‘Realness’ of health scares This study raised the question of whether ‘health scares’ 
were definable simply as events in which people perceive risks that are not really there. To 
answer this, fears of possible consequences in the early stages of an event were identified and 
compared with actual outcomes as far as these were known and identified in the sample.  Due 
to variations between papers in how anticipations and outcomes were described, the process 
necessarily led to some oversimplifications. I followed the majority of articles in using an 
epidemiological definition of risk as the basis for the comparison. However, outcomes were 
quantified in only some cases, and fears were never quantified, only indicated by general 
reference to the potential effects on an indicated population or more frequently in the 
subjective terms of epidemiological incidence (large, moderate etc). Moreover, scientific 
controversy continues to some degree in many cases. Both fears and outcomes were therefore 
placed simply in one of three very broad categories of high, moderate or low incidence, to which 
I have assigned the descriptive labels ‘catastrophe’, ‘crisis’ and ‘false alarm’.  
 
The results are summarized in Table IV, which shows that ‘health scares’ are indeed 
mostly events in which the outcomes turn out to be not nearly as large as was feared (however 
they were feared), after all, ie, they mostly turn out to be ‘false alarms’. In many, often high-
profile, cases, for example BSE, anthrax, or necrotizing fasciitis, the mismatch between fear and 
outcome was the largest possible, with catastrophe envisioned but only very tiny numbers for 
mortality/ morbidity eventuating (but let us remember the consequence for those unfortunate 
individuals was indeed catastrophic). I would suggest this definition: health scares are events in 
which the health of a population or large subpopulation is at risk to an uncertain and 
potentially devastating degree.  
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Table IV: Fears/ Outcomes as described in articles  
 
This table compares 
what experts feared at 
the beginning of a health 
scare event 
(‘anticipation’), with 
what actually occurred 
(‘outcomes’) in terms of 
mortality and morbidity 
ANTICIPATION AT OUTSET 
Fear of catastrophe 
(high incidence) 
Fear of crisis 
 (moderate incidence) 
‘False alarm’ 
(low incidence) 
O
U
TC
O
M
ES
 
Catastrophe A  
HIV/AIDS (developing 
world) 
B 
-- 
C 
-- 
Crisis D 
HIV/AIDS (first world) 
E 
Cholera, e coli, 
cryptosporidium in water, 
lead, meningitis 
F 
-- 
‘False alarm’ BSE, anthrax, SARS, Radon, West Nile virus Acrylamide, fluoride in 
water, Oral contraceptives, 
interferon, channel 
blockers, powerlines / 
mobile phones, vaccines, 
Tylenol tampering, dioxin, GM foods, flesh eating disease, 
radiation, breast implants, terrorism, chloresterol in eggs, 
Ebola, Alar, PCBs, swine influenza, rBST, HRT, X rays, 
phthalates 
 
*this table excludes cases where fears/outcomes data was unable to be determined 
 
Two points about this result deserve discussion. Firstly, this finding largely, if 
imprecisely, reflects fears held by the authors of the sample, ie by health professionals, 
especially in articles that explicitly (and unfavourably) contrasted ‘high’ public fears with expert 
consensus of low incidence. The second point, and it is of immense importance, is that in this 
sample of retrospectives outcomes were typically treated as the chief measure of risk and how 
risk was perceived was a function of when it was considered. If mortality, or other physical 
consequence such as cessation of medication, was high, the risk was perceived to have been 
‘real’ after all – and vice versa. But in fact social responses to any given risk event modified the 
outcome. For example, the low mortality from SARS in Canada (which was considered by many 
after the event to be a ‘false alarm’ (see Skinner 2003)) was dependent on, inter alia, 
quarantines and hospital closures arising from initial high perceptions of risk.  
 
Types of scare Central themes were identified in the representation of each health scare event. 
Clustering these allowed health scares to be usefully classified according to 6 major domains. 
Some health scares fitted more than one domain: nvCJD, for example, was represented as both 
a disease and as an outcome of late industrial agribusiness practices (Miller, 1999; Ratzan, 
1998). This sample suggested that particular social dynamics are identifiable and may predict 
the overall trajectory of events within each domain.  
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Table V: Domains of social concern in framing of health scares 
 
Domain Health scares 
Disease BSE, HIV/AIDS, Anthrax, SARS, West Nile virus, meningitis, flesh 
eating disease, toxoplasmosis, cholera, tuberculosis, swine 
influenza 
Contaminants of air, food, water E coli, cryptosporidium, dioxins, fluoride in water, air pollution, 
irradiated food, acrylamide 
Environmental pollution & chemicals Dioxins, radon gas, radiation, oil spills, lead, alar, silica, PCBs, 
rBST, hazardous wastes 
Side effects of treatments Oral contraceptives, HRT, vaccines, blood products, breast 
cancer, channel blockers, interferon, radium, phthalates 
Intentional Harm Anthrax, Tylenol tampering, terror 
Unintended consequences of 
production, industry, agriculture 
BSE, Dioxins, GM foods, powerlines /mobile phones, breast 
implants, acrylamide, PCBs, tampons 
 
** excludes those unclassifiable (poisoning, cancer mortality, faulty condoms) 
 
Geography Health scares were overwhelmingly reported from the developed world – from 
North America, the United Kingdom, western Europe and Australia. The exceptions were: 
reports on SARS from China (2 articles); reports of condom failure and HIV/AIDS concerns from 
Africa and India (3 articles); and two reports of politically suppressed scares (radiation and 
HIV/AIDS) from Russia. Aside from one report of a disastrously handled outbreak of cholera in 
Italy in 1973 (Allum, 1973), the search found no reports of devastating epidemic disease in the 
developing world described as ‘health scares’.  
 
Temporal aspects Whilst being in some sense identifiable events, health scares were not 
necessarily bounded in time; in many cases, controversy continues at some level. The best proxy 
for defining the ‘life’ of a health scare was the media, but anxiety about an issue or dissent from 
expert or policy opinion of course can and does persist in the absence of media attention 
(Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997). All the health scares in the sample occurred in the period after 1970, 
though a few of the issues, such as the contraceptive Pill and some industrial chemicals (see eg 
(Rosner and Markowitz, 2002) had longer histories. 
 
No doubt both geographical and temporal aspects of the sample were largely an artifact of the 
search criteria; searches in other languages or specific to other countries or to past times 
(articles published prior to the 1970s are less likely to have been indexed in the databases 
searched) may have identified similar issues and preoccupations. However the unevenness of 
these results could also be understood as further evidence of the well-identified recent 
escalation of perceptions of insecurity and interest in disasters and disaster planning in the 
developed world (Beck and Ritter, 1992), and/or for the increasing perceptions of risk in public 
health (Skolbekken 1995). 
 
Social Impacts Negative social and economic impacts, from high costs to tourism (SARS), 
agribusiness (BSE) or industry (acrylamide) to the stigmatization of vulnerable social groups 
(SARS, HIV/AIDS), were the central focus of most retrospectives, because it is these impacts that 
authors hoped could be avoided or minimized by better communication and risk management in 
the future. In this sense the risks posed by health scares are as much social and economic as 
 10 
they are physical, and responses to health scare events implicitly or explicitly attempted to 
balance perceived biological with perceived social risks.  
 
Table VI: Selected impacts of significant health scares 
 
Scare Outcomes 
Oral contraceptives Cessation of use mid cycle; unwanted pregnancies; abortions; change in 
prescriptions 
BSE Enormous economic impact on farmers in UK and Canada; trade bans; 
restrictions on blood donations; mortality in those treated with growth 
hormone 
HIV/AIDS Severe mortality; protest; social change; economic devastation in third world; 
trade disagreements over pharmaceuticals 
Anthrax Public demand for particular antibiotic (cipro), demand on health services; 
security measures 
SARS Enormous economic devastation and impact on health services in affected 
countries; travel restrictions; quarantine; some mortality; reappraisal of some 
epidemic preparedness plans and reporting measures 
HRT Cessation mid cycle with attendant health issues; drops and changes in 
prescriptions 
Tylenol tampering Economic loss; new products manufactured; growth in risk communication 
techniques 
GM foods Protest; economic pressure 
Powerlines / mobile 
phones 
In some countries, expensive resiting of phone lines or restrictions on mobile 
phone masts; public protest; political impacts 
Blood products 
contamination 
Expensive callbacks and recalls; restrictions on donors; some affected 
recipients 
Breast implants Enormous economic impacts from litigation 
Terror Enormous political and economic impacts; travel restrictions 
Radiation NIMBY phenomenon; growth in risk studies; accidents causing mortality 
Hazardous wastes Economic impacts; litigation; political controversy 
Swine influenza Large impact on US health services; vaccine side effects  
  
Causation / non-causation Causation of health scares were complex, as discussed in the analysis 
of risk signal amplifiers below. Usefully, however, this sample clearly showed that causation 
cannot be considered simply in terms of inappropriate public anxiety about small or non 
existent risks (though this could be factors on occasion). Only 8 publications covering just three 
topics – powerlines/mobile telephone masts, vaccines and fluoridation of drinking water 
(Ackermann, Chapman, and Leask, 2004; Brown, 2000; Burgess, 2002; Fisher, 1983; Johnston, 
1987; Anon., 1975; Park, 1996; Sullivan, 1998) - addressed situations in which a clear expert 
consensus of minimal or no risk differed markedly from public response to that risk. The authors 
in this sample took a complicated and ambivalent approach when attributing causality or 
responsibility for health scares. They sometimes rejected and sometimes embraced models that 
blame health scares solely on failures by the public, media or government to appropriately (ie, 
scientifically) understand risks, suggesting that while at times experts become frustrated with 
social groups who acted in ways that were considerably out of step from expert risk assessment, 
they nevertheless appreciate that health scares are generated out of complex interactions and 
perceptions between different social groups. 
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The social construction of health scares: amplifications and issues 
 
The studies in this sample raised a very broad array of social, philosophical, policy-
related, and ethical issues, most of which could be, and some have been, the subject of 
extensive literatures themselves. This study focused on identifying where and how risk signal 
amplification occurred among four major stakeholder groups: experts, policymakers, journalists 
and the mass media, and the general public.  
 
Experts and evidence 
 
Thirty publications in the sample primarily discussed issues relating to experts and 
evidence. Of these, a clear majority (26 publications) were simply concerned with getting the 
data right, on the assumption, commonly attributed to experts (Fischhoff, 1995; Lupton, 1999), 
that the appropriate course of action will emerge logically and be followed (eg Balasch, 1997; 
Benagiano and Primiero, 1999; Furedi, 1999; Urwin, 1999). In these publications, unsurprisingly, 
the scare event was attributed to the failure of the public and media to perceive and represent 
the risk accurately (‘accurately’ being defined by expert assessment), eg Campion, 1997; 
Johnston, 1987. However, 11 articles from the subset (n = 30) addressed situations in which it 
was at the expert level that risk signal amplification occurred (with results that may or may not 
be judged as undesirable).  
 
Firstly, uncertainty greatly amplified risk signals among experts, who tended to react 
according to worst case scenarios, perhaps at the cost of other less catastrophic risk 
assessments (Moore, 1982; Naylor, 2003; Stoto, 2002). Examples include the early period of the 
Tylenol poisonings, the first weeks of SARS in Toronto, and the appearance of a new strain of 
influenza in 1976. In the case of swine influenza and SARS, preventive actions were taken 
without formal parameters for what kind of evidence would justify their cessation (Naylor, 2003) 
(Neustadt and Fineberg, 1983). 
 
Secondly, lack of resources amplified risk signals among experts under great pressure. In 
cases such as the anthrax letters (Bond, 2002; Kennedy, 2003; United States General Accounting 
Office, 2003), SARS and the Tylenol poisonings the burdens of stress, overwork, lack of sleep and 
anxiety among experts responding to the crisis was very high. 
 
Thirdly, experts and scientific institutions were often identified as inexperienced, 
untrained communicators (Blumenthal, 2002; Fewsmith, 2003; Granot, 1999; Scowen, 1996). 
Examples include the 1995 oral contraceptive scare in the UK, anthrax in the US, and SARS in 
Toronto (Naylor, 2003; Spitzer, 1997). In these cases amplification was especially associated 
with information broadcast in the media before GPs had official, detailed knowledge of it. It is 
noteworthy that only 4 publications from the entire sample, none of which were written by 
health experts, mentioned or referenced relevant work by risk communication scholars or 
specialists, suggesting a knowledge translation gap between health and risk communication 
expertise.  
 
Fourthly, inconclusive research (or, more precisely, research made public at too 
inconclusive a stage to justify public or policy action) could amplify risk signals. In several cases 
experts misjudges the appropriate timing for the public release of information. Examples include 
the 1995 oral contraceptives scare in Britain, concerns about hormone replacement therapy 
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from the Million Women study, and the link between acrylamide and cancer (Lofstedt, 2003; 
Panay, 2004; Spitzer, 1997, 1999; Williams, Kelly, Carvalho, and Feely, 1998)). Some writers 
argued that exhaustive scientific debate should be required before political and public 
judgments are formed (Benagiano and Primiero, 1999), but others pointed out that experts may 
feel caught between accusations of cover-up or collusion if they do not publicise information, 
and accusations of scare-mongering if they do (Shickle, 2000). 
  
Fifthly, the technical content of communication could amplify risk signals (14 articles 
from the sample). Describing risk in relative rather than absolute terms was frequently a 
problem in health scares related to pharmaceutical products (Baum, 2000; Hunter and Leyden, 
1995; Lilford and Braunholtz, 1996; Skouby, 1998; Spitzer, 1997). Failure to relate incidence 
rates to longer epidemiological patterns amplified concern (Calnan et al., 1976; Chiazze, 
Silverman, and Levin, 1976; Stuart, 1996). One commentator identified the scientific advisory 
committee’s focus on cumulative case numbers rather than on daily incidence rates as an 
amplifying factor in the outbreak of SARS in Toronto (Naylor, 2003).  
 
 Journalists and the mass media 
 
Mass media attention was an important feature of each risk event. This was because the 
mass media, as the primary mechanism for information dissemination in all but closed 
communities of experts, was the factor that gave each health scare its public dimension.  
Authors in the sample overwhelmingly indicated that they considered health scares to be the 
result, at least in part, of media misrepresentations (eg, Anonymous, 2002; Bedford, 1998; 
Sullivan, 1998). However, the media’s importance and utility in disseminating information was 
also recognised (Griffin, Dunwoody, and Zabala, 1998; Naylor, 2003; Robarts Centre for 
Canadian Studies, 2003). It should be noted that the term ‘media’ as used in the sample 
overwhelmingly denoted newspaper and television coverage, although the internet (Eysenbach, 
2003; Kittler, Hobbs, Volk, Kreps, and Bates, 2004), movies (Gwyn, 2002) and press conferences 
were also mentioned. 
 
Even when without bias or misinformation, the existence of media attention amplified 
risk signals and was associated with undesired public responses, such as people who ceased to 
use or altered their medication, falls in the sales of beef, or demands for particular treatments 
(DeSalvo and Block, 2002). Which health risks received coverage was most strongly related to 
the subjective criterion ‘newsworthiness’, where having events to report on, sources of 
information, and the subsequent effects of ‘momentum’ were, inter alia, crucial factors in 
obtaining media attention (Kitzinger and Reilly, 1997; Maxwell, 2003). Risk issues that no longer 
received media coverage returned to public attention when there was an alteration in the 
‘hazard template’ (the collective mental image of the hazard), as when a previously trusted 
medication - say, hormone replacement therapy - was newly seen as risky (Barnett and 
Breakwell, 2003). Alterations in the way a risk is framed could similarly lead to amplification or 
attenuation effects (at least within the media itself) (Ackermann et al., 2004). 
 
Once selected for coverage, general traits in the media tended to amplify health scares, 
including: the preference for anecdotal or rhetorical rather than statistical evidence; similarly, 
reliance on expert testimony rather than on published works; emphasis on controversy rather 
than consensus; and a related tendency to represent issues in terms of polarities rather than 
complexities (Martinez, 1997; Meara, 2002; Nelkin, 1994). Health professionals were particularly 
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frustrated about decontextualisation, where media reports of adverse side effects of vaccines 
and other medical products did not contain discussions of absolute risk, which was typically tiny 
(low incidence), or of overall efficacy (eg Brown, 2000).  
 
The sample demonstrated differences and tensions between the values and goals of 
health professionals and those of journalists. For example, what health professionals viewed as 
unwarranted and decontextualised reporting of negative events, for example reporting vaccine 
risks but not efficacy, journalists saw as the requirements of ‘newsworthiness’ (Meara, 2002). 
Health professionals have criticised journalists’ lack of knowledge and understanding of 
scientific issues (Anonymous, 2002), but in other cases their own lack of experience with, and 
understanding of, the requirements of the media encouraged confusion, speculation and the 
escalation of a scare situation (Lofstedt, 2003). In crisis situations particularly, experts and 
expert institutions were challenged by facing enormous media demand and by juggling the 
different needs of local, national and international media (Naylor, 2003; United States General 
Accounting Office, 2003). Journalists viewed criticisms of their practice by experts - for example 
over their reporting on vaccine risks - as the persuasive talk of biased advocates, not as 
statements by disinterested scientists (Brown, 2000). Only four articles paid attention to 
journalists’ own struggles with balancing their perceived duty to represent dissenting viewpoints 
with their concern about over-amplifying risk (Barnett and Breakwell, 2003; Kitzinger and Reilly, 
1997; Wilson, Code, Dornan, Ahmad, Hebert, and Graham, 2004). These articles also noted the 
use – and occasional suspension – of journalistic codes of conduct in covering particular scares. 
 
Policymakers, government and industry 
 
53 publications were predominantly concerned with issues of government and policy, 
and of these the overwhelming majority explicitly located the cause or exacerbation of health 
scare events in government mishandling (eg Ratzan, 1998), willful ignorance (eg, HIV/AIDS in 
Africa or India (Gilada, 1996; Ingram, 1996) or unethical behaviour (Callahan, 1989; Gibbs and 
Lester, 1996; Rosner and Markowitz, 2002; Ryder, 1999). Across the sample the clear consensus 
was that greater honesty, openness, and transparency from government, and consequent gains 
in public trust, were required to most effectively and efficiently manage risk communication 
(Leiss and Chociolko, 1994; Powell and Leiss, 1997; Stoto, 2002). 
 
Government risk communication specifically, or lack thereof or mistakes therein, was 
the chief subject of analyses in 23 of the subset (n = 53) publications. Across a range of issues 
the main criticisms concerned government unwillingness to admit the existence of risks and 
hence the responsibility for managing them. Risk communication and policy commentators saw 
government failure to understand that public risk perceptions are strongly shaped by common 
values or ‘cognitive biases’, not expert evidence, as the cause of overly paternalistic 
communications downplaying risks and invalidating public concerns (Sandman and Lanard, May 
2003). Government actions (such as regulation or legislation), or the absence of them, were 
singled out for criticism, and occasionally praise (Zavestoski, 2002), as essential components of 
effective risk communication that more efficiently acted to amplify or attenuate risk signals than 
could mere words (eg Burgess, 2002). 
 
The consequences of poor risk communication, including lack of action on risks, were to 
foment anxiety. Loss of trust in government was associated with non-compliant self-protective 
behaviour (such as ceasing to eat beef) or growing protest (Beamish, 2001). Government 
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tardiness in responding to risk issues generated risk information vacuums that were often filled 
by special interest groups who could then ‘capture’ how a risk was defined, and hence establish 
a policy agenda for responding to them. For example, government failure to effectively 
communicate about dioxins has allowed Greenpeace to effectively control how they are 
perceived (bad) and hence, what should be done about them (industry bans) (Leiss, 2001). 
 
Seventeen of the subset raised concerns about policy formation for health risk issues. In 
general governments were seen as slow to act when facing conditions of uncertainty (Telfer, 
1999). They tended to have an all-or-nothing approach, intervening either too late or too much, 
as for example when the United States attempted to vaccinate all citizens against a possible 
epidemic of influenza that never in fact occurred (Powell and Leiss, 1997; Stoto, 2002). Recent 
experiences with SARS and anthrax indicated that diminishing public health funding would only 
further limit government flexibility in responding to scare situations (DeSalvo and Block, 2002; 
Naylor, 2003).  Policymaking was further constrained by the international aspect of scares like 
BSE, such that government response can be directed primarily by trade negotiations (Ratzan, 
1998), and requires negotiating standards (Williams et al., 1998) and borders (Aaltola, 1999) 
(European Parliament, 1998).  
 
Interestingly, differences in political institutions, policy styles, past experiences, media 
receptivity and national cultures resulted in highly divergent policy responses to the same risks. 
For example, the very different, but substantial and extensive, regulations that surround 
powerline and mobile phone mast placement in Australia, Italy, and the UK, put in place despite 
scientific skepticism and opposing industry interests, can be ascribed to (inter alia) alliances 
between activists and politicians, media tolerance for the issue, and easy integration of 
emissions regulations into existing regulatory environments. (The significant regulatory action 
taken in these three countries in fact further amplified risk signals and gave the controversy 
more life, but may have also minimized distrust in government and hence public opposition to 
the masts (Burgess, 2002). 
 
The general public  
 
Virtually throughout the sample the public was represented as the arena where the 
impacts and consequences of health scare events were observed – not as the cause or location 
of risk signal amplification. In other words, none of the articles in this sample blamed public 
ignorance or irrationality as a cause of, or chief factor in, health scares, except where 
information was deliberately withheld, though it was telling that two had titles asking whether 
or not it was ‘worth it’ to communicate risk information to the public (Meara, 2002; Shickle, 
2000) (and see (Kaeferstein and Moy, 1993). The image of health professionals as experts 
impatient with a public that ‘gets it wrong’ or as not understanding lay perceptions of risk was 
not borne out by the sample. 
 
The primary measures of public response were market-based – changes in filled 
prescriptions (Brunt, Murray, Hui, Kesterson, Perkins, and Tierney, 2003), demands for 
medication, declines in the sale of beef  (Ratzan, 1998). There was insufficient information in the 
sample to indicate how extensive, and how long lasting, these behavioural changes were, what 
they signified, or what concerns they expressed. There was some evidence that public choices 
were pragmatic – people returned to buying beef when prices fell sufficiently, and continued to 
use mobile phones even when concerns about their possible association with cancer were at 
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their height (Burgess, 2002). Stigmatisation of particular groups (people with HIV/AIDS, the 
homeless, drug users and Asians during the SARS outbreak) was discussed in 7 studies as one of 
the most destructive – and recurring - social responses to scares of communicable disease 
(Brock, 1989; Cullinan, 1991; Goldin, 1994; Jimenez, 2003; Jones, 1992; Leung, 2004; Lupton, 
1994). 
  
Twelve publications in the sample directly investigated public perceptions of, and / or 
reactions to, a health scare event, of which only 3 (Goldin, 1994; Leung, 2004; Schwarz, 1995) 
discussed the response of non-white people. The major paradigm for understanding public 
responses to health scare situations, used very successfully by 13 of studies in the sample, was 
psychometric studies of risk perception (Slovic, 2000). Several case studies in the sample also 
showed that public perceptions are strongly affected by context, such as past experience 
(Hunter and Leyden, 1995).  
 
 Nine articles offered sociological explanations for public response in health scares, 
suggesting cultural context was of prime importance. For example, the French public’s 
opposition to genetically modified foods, despite their strict regulation and long established use 
(factors that usually predict enhanced trust and lowered perceptions of risk) was attributed to a 
common culture of humanism applied to new technology and a collective commitment to 
particular aesthetic values (Whiteside, 2003). Some of these studies suggest that health scares 
may be the product of deep cultural anxieties (such as between self and other, the clean and 
unclean) expressed symbolically (Lupton, 1994; McIntosh, 2000).  
 
Fiveteen of the articles offered prescriptive advice for how authorities should 
communicate with the public in health scare situations, or provided practical data on those 
communications. The consensus of experiences, from rebuilding trust in Tylenol to 
communicating during SARS, was that the chief components of good communication were 
recognizing risks, validating public fears even if they seem frustratingly unreasonable (eg 
Sandman and Lanard, May 2003), and clearly communicating useful information that relate to 
those fears (Moore, 1982). It was important to use variations in the form of communication, 
such as using narrative, cultural and technical appeals when communicating health risks 
(Golding, Krimsky, and Plough, 1992; Hamilton, 2003) and multiple information channels, 
including existing community based groups, in health scares (Griffin et al., 1998; Maxwell, 2003; 
United States Geneal Accounting Office, 2003).  
 
In line with current risk communication recommendations, studies in this sample also advocated 
that risk communication in health scares be conceptualized not as the transfer of information to 
a passive public, but as an active dialogue between the public and experts/policymakers, but 
how this was to be achieved was not discussed.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This study suggests that health scares are events in which significant fears are entertained for 
the health of a population or large sub-population in the early stages. It also demonstrates that 
risk is typically defined epidemiologically in terms of mortality and morbidity, and that judged on 
these terms, the typical profile of a health scare is one in which fears prove in the end to be 
more or less groundless. In general (but not always) mortality has not, in fact, occurred in 
catastrophic or crisis dimensions. Because of this, risks have appeared in retrospect to be not-
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real or grossly overestimated, and the legitimate grounds for those fears in the initial stages of 
the event are forgotten.  
 
What makes a risk a risk – or rather, the magnitude of a risk - is often understood 
retrospectively, in terms of the outcomes. But as the cases in this study demonstrate, outcomes 
are influenced by reactions along the way. Risk signal amplification is often increased by 
different social actors’ various responses to perceptions of risk in the early stages of a health 
scare event. Trade embargoes, changes in leisure travel or cessation of medication have often 
amplified perceptions of risk and generated significant negative economic, political or social 
impacts. Thus, as predicted by the SAR framework, the risks posed by health scares turn out to 
be as much social and economic as biological, if we judge them by their consequences. This 
study suggests therefore that policymakers who manage health scare events need to balance 
the ‘goods’ produced by initial strong responses to a risk against the ‘bads’ of those same 
responses.  
 
Can responses to health scare events be improved so that their negative impacts can be avoided 
or minimized? This study has sought the beginnings of the answer to this question by broadly 
identifying where and why risk signal amplification has taken place. At the outset of any risk 
event there are no easy answers because of the level of uncertainty - a factor that amplifies risk 
signals anyway, especially among responding experts. The sample did serve to emphasise that 
the simple answers - such as public ‘panic’ or media scaremongering – that may be prompted by 
the frustrations of observing vast expenditures on (what turn out to be) small risks in fact 
explain very little. Fortunately it also demonstrated that the image of responding experts as 
condescending and ignorant of factors that influence lay reactions to risk is inaccurate. Instead, 
this survey suggests that it will be useful to closely examine the dynamics that drive risk signal 
amplification in different categories of health scare, and tabulates the major factors that have 
been claimed to do so in past scares among different stakeholder groups.  
 
Certain features that caused or exacerbated health scares did emerge: expert inexperience with, 
or lack of resources for, risk communication; the biases in representation generated by the 
imperatives of ‘newsworthiness’ in the media; reluctance to take (open, honest) action on the 
part of governments; and cataclysmic consumer reactions by parts of the general public. But 
these retrospectively easy-to-identify factors might better be expressed as a series of dilemmas: 
over when and how experts should make research results public; how journalists might 
represent health risks such that both the concerns of health professionals and their own 
professional requirements are maximally satisfied; when and how policymakers might propose 
interventions to attenuate, not prolong, the life of a risk issue; and what the public really wants 
to know and has a right to expect as a result of that knowledge. No firm criteria for how to 
respond best to any of these dilemmas could be derived from the sample, and it seems 
inappropriate to make general recommendations for action based on these results. Instead, 
further research into the precise dynamics of each different domain or category of health scare 
is likely to yield highly useful results. 
 
This study also suggests that research into health scares will confront significant 
knowledge translation gaps. Scholars know why people reacted strongly to anthrax or BSE – 
because of cognitive biases that make unknown, uncontrolled and imposed risks so much scarier 
– and they know many of the limitations of the mass media and how to maximize its utility and 
minimize its biases. Yet the sample also showed that such knowledge is often limited in different 
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disciplinary groups (publications from public health journals showed little or no familiarity with 
social studies of risk, for example). The results suggests we need, not simply more research into 
(for example) the imaginative power exercised by worst-case scenarios in health expert’s 
decision making, but the means to invite these experts and other stakeholders to reflect more 
self-critically on their own amplifying roles. Above all there is need for further study of the 
ethical implications of decisions made under conditions of uncertainty, and of interventions into 
existing scare situations. The basic questions of precisely who is scared and for what reason in 
different health scare situations, what the outcomes of that fear are, and whether or not these 
outcomes are good or bad, still demand critical attention in the future. 
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